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The Constitution as an
Economic Document

Richard A. Posner*

There was a time when an "economic" theory of the Constitution
meant the theory, expounded years ago by Charles Beard, that the
purpose of the Constitution was to redistribute wealth from the
poorer segments of society to the upper class, to which the Framers
belonged.' This was an extremely narrow view, both of economics
(implicitly viewed by Beard as the unmasking of exploitation) and of
the Constitution, and is now discredited. 2 Today when one thinks
of how economics might be used to study the Constitution, no fewer
than eight distinct (though overlapping) topics come to mind:
(1) The economic theory of constitutionalism; that is, the economic properties, and likely consequences, of requiring a
supermajority for some kinds of political change.
(2) The economics of constitutional design - of the constitutive
rules of a political system - and thus (a) of the separation of powers within the federal government and (b) of federalism (i.e., the
overlapping sovereignty of the federal government and the
states).
(3) The economic effects (broadly defined) of specific constitutional doctrines, such as the exclusionary rule or the limitations
* Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; Senior Lecturer,
University of Chicago Law School. The research assistance of Nir Yarden and John
Muller, and the exceptionally helpful comments of Gary Becker, Edward DuMont, Frank
Easterbrook, David Friedman, Sanford Levinson, Fred McChesney, Charles Silver,
George Stigler, and Cass Sunstein, are gratefully acknowledged.
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that the Supreme Court has imposed in the name of the First
Amendment on suits against the media for defamation, whether
or not the doctrines themselves are founded on sound, or on any,
economic principles.
(4) The interpretation of constitutional provisions or doctrines
that may have an implicit economic logic - for example, freedom
of speech, when conceived of as a guarantor of a free market in
ideas; the commerce clause, when conceived of as a guarantor of a
national common market; and the takings clause, when conceived
of as a guarantor of property rights.
(5) Proposals to refashion constitutional law to make it a comprehensive protection of free markets, whether through reinterpretation of existing provisions or through new amendments,
such as a balanced-budget amendment.
(6) The problem of "dualism," by which I mean the paradox of
the Supreme Court's being passionately committed to liberty in
the personal sphere and almost indifferent to liberty in the economic sphere.
(7) The relationship (if any) between the Constitution, as
drafted and as interpreted, and the economic growth of the
United States.
(8) The extent to which judges should feel themselves free to
use economic analysis as an overarching guide to constitutional
interpretation (that is, beyond the limits of points (3) and (4)); in
other words, the relationship between economics and
interpretation.
I shall touch on each of these eight areas, though the touch will at
times be light.

I.

The Economics of Constitutionalism

Words like "constitution" and "constitutionalism" have multiple
rather than single meanings. They can refer to the principle of limited government, to the constitutive rules of government, to the
most important rules -

constitutive and otherwise

-

of govern-

ment, and to legislation that cannot be revised by the ordinary legislative process. It is with the last of these meanings that I shall begin,
for it is perhaps the most distinctive feature of the United States
Constitution that it can be changed only by a supermajority. This
feature raises the question - on which there is a substantial economic literature3 - of what constitutive rules and what rights ought
3. See, e.g., G. BRENNAN &J. BUCHANAN, THE REASON OF RULES: CONSTIuTIONAL
POLrIICAL ECONOMY (1985);J. BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCx, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT ch.

6 (1962) ("A Generalized Economic Theory of Constitutions"); Davidson, The Limits of
ConstitutionalDeterminism, in CONSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS: CONTAINING THE ECONOMIC
POWERS OF GOVERNMENT 61 (R. McKenzie ed. 1984); Macey, Competing Economic INiews of
the Constitution, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 50 (1987); Rae, Decision-Rulesand IndividualFalues

in Constitutional Choice, 63 AM. POL. ScI. REV. 40 (1969).
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to be placed beyond the power of a majority to correct. I shall take
up that question after first examining a largely unexamined, but I
think logically prior, economic problem inherent in the decision to
have a written constitution that cannot be changed through the ordinary legislative process. 4 This is the problem of governance by
rules over time.
The problem has been discussed extensively in relation to longterm contracts and (a substitute for long-term contracts, as we shall
see) public-utility regulation. A contract cannot (in general) be lawfully revoked or modified without the unanimous consent of the parties. In this respect it is more like a constitution, which requires a
supermajority to amend, than like a statute, which requires only a
majority to amend and is therefore relatively easy to alter as
changed circumstances may require. Like a constitution, but unlike
a statute, a contract establishes a rule that is difficult to change yet is
designed to govern the future.
The name given in the contract setting to governance by rules
over time is "contingent contracting" - contracting with reference
to contingencies that may never occur. 5 The cost of anticipating
and providing explicitly for all possible contingencies is very high;
in the case of a contract designed to remain in force for the indefinite future and govern a wide range of social interactions, it is for all
practical purposes infinite. So, if some contingency arises, there
may very well be no contractually specified response to it. What to
do? One possibility is a supplementing interpretation by a court an effort to supply the solution the parties might have been expected to supply if they had negotiated with reference to the contingency. The difficulty is that if the contingency occurs many years
after the contract was made, a court may find it impossible to figure
out what the parties would have decided to do about the contingency had they foreseen it and contracted with specific reference to
it.
Another possibility is renegotiation by the parties. This solution
may be reasonably satisfactory if the situation is one of bilateral monopoly, and thus mutual dependence, which creates pressure for a
solution (while also, however, making negotiation costly). 6 But it
has seemed inadequate where only one party to the contract is going
to have a monopoly when the contingency occurs - for example,
where a single firm (street railway, retail supplier of electricity, local
telephone company, etc.) is going to confront a mass of unorganized consumers for the indefinite future. That essentially would be
the situation in constitutional law if the Constitution just "ran out,"
4. If a constitution can be amended as easily as a statute can be amended, then
functionally it is a statute, at least in a country like ours where, unlike in England, custom
and tradition are not venerated.
5. See K. ARROW, ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RISK-BEARING (1971); R. POSNER, EcoNomIc ANALYSIS OF LAW §§ 4.1, 13.7 (3d ed. 1986); 0. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANrITRusT IMPLICATIONS (1975); Williamson, Franchise Bidding
for Natural Monopolies - In General and with Respect to C4TI 7 BELLJ. ECON. 73 (1976).
6. Cf Epstein, hi Defense of the Contract at Will. 51 U. CHI. L. RFv. 947 (1984).
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in the sense of being deemed inoperative if problems not foreseen
and provided for by the Framers arose, leaving the society's constitutional arrangements to a renegotiation between the government
and the people.
Another possible solution - the regulatory solution of having a

permanent agency act (in principle, though generally not in practice) as the consumers' representative - is approximated in the constitutional setting by the Supreme Court, which is designed to be
independent, so far as possible, from the other branches of government. When viewed so, as a kind of regulatory protector of the citizenry, the Court cannot adopt a narrow interpretation of the
constitutional text, because that text will not provide for all possible
contingencies, especially ones that arise over a period of what is now
two hundred years. On this view, the significance of the constitutional text as a constraint on courts is in setting broad outer bounds
to the exercise of judicial discretion rather than in prescribing the
actual rules of decision. As a realistic matter, this approach describes much of constitutional law; it is a body ofjudge-made law,
constrained by the constitutional text but not derived from it or prescribed by it in a substantial sense.
The regulatory analogy is reinforced by consideration of the economic tradeoffs between rules and standards as methods of controlling behavior. 7 A rule is a precise directive that leaves little
discretion to those charged with applying it; a standard provides
some direction but delegates considerable discretion to those
charged with applying it. A standard is more adaptable to changed
circumstances than a rule and is therefore preferred when the indefinite future is being regulated. Public-utility statutes usually (but
not always) contain broad standards such as "public convenience
and necessity." The Constitution, too, contains many broadly
worded provisions that invite or at least permit interpretation as
standards - "freedom of speech," "respecting an establishment of
religion," "general welfare," "necessary and proper," "due process," "cruel and unusual punishments," etc. - and many of its
rule-like provisions have become either obsolete, irksome, or irrelevant (e.g., the right to bear arms, the right to jury trial in civil cases
at law if the stakes exceed $20, the requirement that the President
be native-born and at least thirty-five years old). The problem with
a standard is that often its practical effect is to delegate the real policymaking authority to the persons who administer the standard - in
the present setting, thejudges. Because of this problem it may well
be descriptively more accurate to view the Supreme Court as the
7. See Ehrlich & Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J.
257 (1974).
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(constrained) agent of the present generation than as the agent of
the Constitution's Framers, the latter view being unrealistic because
of an insurmountable agency-cost problem. The Framers are dead;
the "instructions" they left, the most important of which are in any
event (and inevitably) vague, are losing pertinence with every passing year; and the Framers' agents - if this is how the judges should
be viewed normatively - have weak incentives to be faithful agents.
Although, as Professor Landes and I have argued, an independent
judiciary is a necessary condition for enforcing legislative "deals"
(including the original "deal" embodied in the Constitution and Bill
of Rights) in accordance with their original tenor rather than current political preferences, 8 it is not a sufficient condition, because it
does not by itself create strong incentives forjudges to carry out the
will of the Framers rather than their own will.
The question ofjudicial incentives is a baffling one because judicial employment, especially at the federal level, is hedged with restrictions designed to reduce, though they can never eliminate, the
role of self-interest in judicial decisionmaking. One is led to ask
such questions as: Why should minorities entrust their protection
to judges - what incentive has the judiciary, which is not likely to be
drawn predominantly from members of minority groups, to side
with those groups rather than the majority? -Shouldn't minorities be
expected to do well in the legislative arena, where, as we know, special interest groups, invariably minority groups of some sort, generally do well? About all that can be said in our present and
inadequate state of knowledge ofjudicial incentives is that the stripping away of the usual incentives to self-advancement makes it
somewhat more likely that judges will actually try to conform their
decisions to the law; so if the law contains protections for minorities,
those protections are more likely to be enforced by judges than by
legislators. More on this in Part VIII.
Although agency costs are the subject of an extensive economic
literature, 9 they have been ignored in economic writing about constitutionalism. Libertarian economists, and (a largely overlapping
group) members of the balanced-budget amendment school, 10 often
evince an unwarranted faith in the power of the written word to anticipate contingencies and constrain responses to them, making the
judges' role mechanical and their incentives an uninteresting question. Economists and other nonlawyers tend to exaggerate the objectivity of judicial decisions, i.e., the degree to which those
decisions are determined by nondiscretionary application of clear
and settled principles. Not so Richard Epstein, a lawyer who recognizes the slipperiness of legal text and wants the judges to make new
8. See Landes & Posner, The IndependentJudidat, in an Interest-Group Peispective 18J.

LAw & ECON. 875 (1975).

9. See, e.g., Jensen & Meckling, Theomy of the Firm: .MfanagerialBehavior; Agen , Costs
and Owneahip Structure, 3 J. FIN. EcON. 305 (1976).
10. On which see, e.g., THE CONSTITUTION AND THE BUDOET: ARE CONSTITUTIONAL
LIMiTs ON TAX, SPENDING, AND BUDGET POWERS DESIRABLE AT THE FEDERAL LEVEL? (W.S.
Moore & R. Penner eds. 1980).
HeinOnline -- 56 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 8 1987-1988
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constitutional law - aggressively designed to promote free markets
by freely interpreting the Constitution. More on his proposal in
Part IV.
In analogizing the Constitution to a long-term contract, I do not
mean to embrace the fallacy pointed out recently by Russell Hardin
of supposing that constitutions rest on the same solidly consensual
foundations as contracts between adequately informed adults."
Apart from the facts that the Constitution was not ratified by popular vote, that voters are often poorly informed and rarely unanimous, and that many who supported the Constitution did so
because it seemed better than the Articles of Confederation rather
than because it was their preferred set of arrangements, there is the
elementary fact that the vast majority of people who have lived
under the Constitution have never had a chance to vote, directly or
indirectly, for or against it. Acquiescence is not necessarily consent.
For some purposes the Constitution can be analogized to a contract,
but it is not a contract.
Having considered the costs created by having rules or standards
that are difficult to change - costs in inflexibility in the case of
rules, agency costs in the case of standards - I am now prepared to
consider when those costs are worth incurring and when therefore
the supermajoritarian feature that principally distinguishes constitutions from other forms of legislation should be used to place a subject outside the ordinary political arena.
The easiest case is where inflexibility is unimportant because the
required rule is by its nature arbitrary: e.g., two senators from each
state. The harder but more important case is where allowing a topic
to be the subject of ordinary majority-vote politics would invite very
costly rent seeking. If the vote of a simple majority could change
the basic form of government or expropriate the wealth of a minority, enormous resources might be devoted to seeking and resisting
such legislation. In a sense, a supermajoritarian constitutional provision confines legislative discretion to matters that do not matter all
that much; the stakes are not large enough to evoke a disproportionate expenditure of resources on redistributing wealth or utility.
A qualification should be noted: Resources deflected by the Constitution from investment in making fundamental changes or dispossessing minorities of their wealth will be redirected not only into
commercial or other presumptively efficient private activity but also
into efforts to obtain "ordinary" legislative redistributions. And this
brings me to the difficult question that underlies the proposals for a
balanced-budget amendment, whether there should be a general
11. R. Hardin, Why a Constitution? (1987) (copy on file in the offices of the George
Vashington Law Review).
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constitutional prohibition of rent-seeking, or (in other words)
purely redistributive, legislation.1 2 A purely redistributive statute
by definition does not increase the size of the social pie, but actually
shrinks it because resources will be expended on obtaining and resisting the enactment of the statute. So there is an economic argument for outlawing such legislation, and it can be done only by
constitutional provision. The counterargument (more on this later)
is that courts cannot readily identify purely redistributive legislation,
in part because much redistributive legislation may be defensible on
efficiency grounds by reference to problems of social peace, freerider problems, and so forth.
One may be led by this discussion to wonder how a constitution
could ever come to contain substantial protections for disfavored
minorities, such as criminal defendants or members of fringe religious sects; any minority powerful enough to obtain constitutional
protection need hardly fear - one might think - adverse legislation. Three answers come to mind. First, persons who might fear
one day becoming members of a disfavored minority might support
constitutional protection for minorities even at the cost of extending
protection to people they did not like. This does not explain how,
for example, the equal protection clause-designed primarily
though not exclusively for the protection of racial minorities and in
particular blacks-got into the Constitution, but may explain why
the clause is drafted in general terms: so that it can cover groups to
which members of the majority might someday belong. Moreover
(and this is my second point), the interests of minority and majority
groups, or of minority groups that in the aggregate form a majority,
may be so intertwined that there is majority (more precisely,
supermajority) support for a constitutional provision because members of these groups fear that the balance of political power may
someday shift against them. Third, special interest groups are not
excluded from constitutional deliberation, and a minority group
may have the political muscle to obtain a constitutional provision
that a majority of voters do not want.
II.

The Constitutive Principles of the Constitution

Besides protecting rights, the Constitution establishes the basic
constitutive rules of American government (some scholars would regard some of the rights, such as free speech, as constitutive also). I
shall discuss these rules under two headings: "separation of powers" and "federalism."
A.

Separation of Powers' 3
I use this term loosely; I realize that the Framers rejected separa-

12. Macey, supra note 3, Epstein, and others think the Constitution was intended to
do this, so that no amendment is necessary.
13. Silver, Economic Theory of the ConstitutionalSeparationof Powers, 29 PuB.

CHOICE

95

(1977), is a rare example of economic analysis of the separation of powers. On the
HeinOnline -- 56 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 10 1987-1988
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tion of powers in its purest form. The most striking example of this
rejection is the provision giving the President a veto power over legislation; this makes him a part of the legislative process. The requirement of senatorial advice and consent brings the Senate into
the executive process.
These are details, though not unimportant ones; by increasing the
number of persons whose views must be taken seriously, the provisions on sharing power reduce the dangers of mistake and impetuosity. The essential point, however, is that the parceling out of
legislative, executive, and judicial powers among different branches,
with or without much overlap, increases the transaction costs of governing. Effective government requires the concurrence of all three
branches. Hence, separation brings about a situation analogous to
bilateral (or "trilateral") monopoly. Analogous - not identical.
Because none of the branches is a profit maximizer, both the incentives to withhold agreement and the incentives to negotiate to a mutually beneficial solution are different than in the usual case of
bilateral monopoly. But it seems a fair guess that the transaction
costs of governing are indeed higher than they would be in a unitary
system.
They are higher, moreover, for wealth-enhancing programs as
well as for redistributive or exploitive ones. This makes unclear as a
matter of theory whether the separation of powers results in a net
improvement in social welfare compared to a system such as England's, where the executive and legislative powers are combined (in
principle in the House of Commons, in practice in the Cabinet) and
where the courts, though independent in much the same sense as
our courts, do not have power to invalidate legislation. The question has not been examined empirically.
Another wrinkle is that separation 'of powers can lower as well as
raise the costs of government, not only by increasing deliberation
(the point I began this section with) but also by enabling a more
efficient exploitation of the division of labor. Ifjudges' tenure were
subject to the vicissitudes of legislative politics, it would be difficult
to attract able people to a career in judging; law would be even less
stable than it is, because it would change with changes in the opinions or desires of powerful legislators; and the quality of justice
meted out by dependent courts would be low in cases in which the
legislature had an interest. It might even be difficult for the legislature to make the interest group "deals" that are such a staple of
legislative activity. An independent judiciary is more likely to enforce such a deal according to its original terms than ajudiciary that
history of the concept, see MJ.C.

VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF

POWERS (1967).
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bends with every breeze from Congress, and an interest group is
more likely to make a deal if it has some confidence that it will obtain benefits
that extend beyond the two-year term of the enacting
14
Congress.
Similarly, though less certainly, if Congress took upon itself the
executive role, that role might be performed badly (as the Continental Congress discovered), because the effective execution of policy
requires unity of command; I say "might" because this is a problem
that most parliamentary systems have solved. And some observers
believe that experience has demonstrated that courts are not well
equipped to make and execute laws outside the scope of traditional
judicial power - though that has not kept them from trying, others
believe, with great success. The executive branch may be at a comparative disadvantage to the legislative branch in legislating and to
the judicial branch in judging; yet this is not certain, either, because
much of what the executive branch does is legislating (through the
promulgation of regulations) and judging (through administrative
agencies and Article I courts).
Despite all these qualifications, I believe that the separation of
powers is in part an effort to increase governmental efficiency by
tailoring the institutional structure to particular governmental tasks.
The consequence may be to offset the effect of separation in raising
the transaction costs of government; so government may not be
weaker, on balance, than under a system of concentrated powers. It
is true that our government does not seem more efficient, in the
sense of maximizing the wealth of society, than the governments of
other countries at a similar stage of economic development (more
on this later). But this may be because the effect of separation of
powers in increasing transaction costs and thus reducing the scope
(and presumably therefore enhancing the efficiency) of government
is offset by its effect in reducing the costs (and thus facilitating the
expansion) of government by enabling a more thorough division of
labor than in a parliamentary system.
An additional consideration, however, is that the vesting of different governmental powers in different and independent branches
places limits (in principle anyway - more on the actualities of the
situation in Part VI) on the growth of government. The power of
each branch to grow without experiencing a serious loss of control
is inherently limited. Unless Congress relaxed the principle of majority rule, it could not accommodate greater legislative business by
expanding the number of its members. On the contrary, the more
members it had, the higher would be the cost (in communication
and negotiation) of reaching agreement, in accordance with the
formula for the number of links required to connect up all members
of a set (here the set consisting of a majority of the members of each
house of Congress): n(n-1)/2. Congress can do only so much by
14. See Landes & Posner, supra note 8; Crain & Tollison, Constitutional Change in an
Interest-Group Perspective, 8 J. LEGAL S-rUD. 165 (1979).
HeinOnline -- 56 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 12 1987-1988
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hiring staff assistants and delegating responsibility to committees.
It has done what it can, of course.
The same problem of inherent limitations of capacity (namely
large diseconomies of scale) afflicts efforts to expand the decisional
capacity of a court system by increasing the number ofjudges. The
creation of intermediate courts is only a partial solution, because
problems of delay and lack of coordination become more severe
with every increase in the height or width of ajudicial hierarchy, and
because increases in the number, and reductions in the responsibility, of federal judges make it more difficult to recruit able people to
be judges.
The executive branch, being in principle unitary and thus able in
principle to impose a rigid hierarchy controlled by a single person,
faces the fewest difficulties in expanding to accommodate a larger
governmental function. But every enterprise encounters net diseconomies of scale eventually - and governments sooner than
other enterprises because economies of scale in the provision of
most governmental services are quickly exhausted. Hence, the effect of expanding the executive branch is to diminish control and
coordination. Civil service rules further undermine the unity of the
executive branch.
B.

Federalism1 5

The system of power sharing between the federal government
and the states - the system that has come to be called "federalism"
might seem to be just another aspect of the separation of powers.
This is true in one sense but not another. It is true in the sense that
decentralizing government, like creating specialized branches, may
increase efficiency. Federalism enables the massive diseconomies of
scale that would be encountered by any effort to govern so large,
populous, and complex a society as ours from Washington, D.C.,
the way France is governed from Paris or England from London, to
be avoided. It also encourages experimentation with different
methods of providing governmental services and may foster the
provision of services tailored to differing local conditions although these are really just aspects of avoiding diseconomies of
scale. Yet federalism does not substantially increase the transaction
costs of governing, the way the separation of powers within the fed15. For previous discussions of the economics of federalism, see THE ECONOMICS OF
supra note 5,

FEDERALISM (B. Grewal, G. Brennan & R. Mathews eds. 1980); R. POSNER,
ch. 26; R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM ch. 6 (1985);

Easterbrook,

Antitrust and the Economics of Federalism, 26 J.L. & EcoN. 23 (1983); Hamlin, The Political
Economy of Constitutional Federalism, 46 PUB. CHOICE 187 (1985); Rose-Ackerman, Does
Federalism Matter? Political Choice in a Federal Republic, 89 J. POL. ECON. 152 (1981); G.
Stigler, The Constitution and the Economy (May 8, 1987) (unpublished manuscript,
copy on file at the George Washington Law Review).
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eral government does, because, as we are about to see, the federal
government can always override the states in matters within the
scope of its authority. If the federal government could govern only
with the concurrence of the state governments, we would have a federation, not a nation, and the transaction costs of governing would
be exceedingly high. But of course federalism is not costless; one
cost is a more complex legal system than if we had a unitary judiciary enforcing a uniform body of law.
The point I want to emphasize is the efficiency of parceling out
governmental powers among competing (not merely independent)
institutions. With regard to governmental powers exercised on the
state level, or even more clearly on the local level, there is competition among governments to provide good service at low (tax) cost;
those governments that do not will tend to lose residents to the
others. (Such competition exists at the international level as well,
but in severely attenuated form.) The competition is not perfect
(what is?). Not only are there costs of relocation, but some taxable
assets are immobile - land, for example. The Framers were therefore wise not to stop with creating a competitive structure. In the
commerce clause they authorized Congress to regulate interstate
and foreign commerce and thus to prevent states from imposing
harmful externalities on other states and to internalize beneficial externalities; several other provisions also restrict the power of states
to tax or otherwise burden interstate or foreign commerce. The due
process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment
provide some protection to owners of immobile resources, who
without these federal protections might be at the mercy of state expropriation. Consistent with these observations I have tried to construct a theory of federal law in relation to the states that would
define the federal government's mission as one of overcoming the
externalities that a system of competing governments fosters. 16 But
in my previous work I treated the sovereignty of the states (limited
as that sovereignty has become as a result of successive amendments
to and interpretations of the Constitution) as being irrelevant to
economic analysis. It is not; it is what assures a genuine competition
among states. If state and local governments merely were administrative conveniences decreed by the central government, they would
be no obstacle to centralization, i.e., to monopoly government. To
the extent they are independent of the central government they provide real, if today very limited, competitive alternatives for consumers of governmental services.
This point may seem inconsistent with my previous point that the
federal government can override the states in any area within the
capacious scope of its authority. There is indeed little if any constitutional impediment to the federal government's preempting a specific area of governance, but the structure of the Senate, as well as
the states' quasi-sovereign status in the constitutional scheme, dis16. See R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM ch. 6 (1985); see also
Easterbrook, supra note 15.
HeinOnline -- 56 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 14 1987-1988
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courages a wholesale transfer of functions from the states to the federal bureaucracy. The federal system provides a more secure basis
for decentralized government than a formally centralized system
that the central government might (or might not) choose, for reasons of convenience, to decentralize administratively.
But like separation of powers in its economies-of-specialization
aspect, decentralization is a two-edged sword. It makes government
more efficient, but all this means is that it enables government to do
more with a given amount of resources. The result may not be a
smaller government with the same output of services but an equally
large or larger government with a higher output of services - and
the higher output may be inefficient because it may take the form of
economically unwarranted interferences (redistributive or paternalistic) with free markets and personal liberty.
The Economic Criticism of Specific ConstitutionalDoctrines
Despite what I have said so far, I certainly do not believe that
every provision of the Constitution is efficiency enhancing. An example of one that is not is the provision that the President must be
at least thirty-five years old. This is rank paternalism. It is true that,
for a variety of good economic reasons, voters lack good information about candidates; but the one fact a voter is well able to assess
in evaluating a candidate's qualifications is the candidate's age. A
more important example is the self-incrimination clause of the Fifth
Amendment; no economic reason has ever been offered for why
government should not be allowed to penalize a person who refuses
to give testimony, merely because the testimony might show that the
person has committed a crime. And in an age when constitutional
tort suits are a reality, the exclusionary rule - an inefficient sanction
for violations of the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and
seizures - no longer has a persuasive eco7
nomic justification.'
But a legal doctrine is not beyond the range of fruitful economic
analysis just because the doctrine lacks a core of economic good
sense, especially if, as is often the case, the doctrine has an implicit
economic logic - only a bad one. The greatest triumphs of "law
IL

17. These two examples, self-incrimination and the exclusionary rule, are discussed
in Posner, Excessive SanctionsforGovernmentalMisconduct in CriminalCases, 57 WASH. L. REV.
635 (1982); see also Posner, Rethinking the FourthAmendment, 1981 Sup. CT. REV. 49. A
caveat should be entered: Rules conferring broad tort immunities on public officials
may, when combined with the Supreme Court's refusal to recognize respondeat superior
(employer's vicarious liability) in constitutional, tort suits, deprive the tort remedy of
much ofits practical utility. See id. at 64-68. I add - though it should not be necessary
to do so (the qualification should be obvious) - that when I say there is no "economic"

reason for a rule or practice or institution, I do not mean there is no reason, period.
There may be good reasons that are not economic.
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and economics" have come in demonstrating the economic senselessness of well-established legal doctrines in such fields as antitrust
and corporation law. So when, as in the Supreme Court's efforts to
defend more extensive regulation of broadcast than of print media
by reference to the inherent "scarcity" of the electromagnetic spectrum, 18 the Court neglects greater scarcities that afflict the production of newspapers, or when it makes arbitrary distinctions between
personal and economic rights (see Part V), its economic blunders
should be pointed out - and maybe eventually the doctrines will be
changed, just as many antitrust doctrines have been changed under
the pressure (it seems) of careful economic thinking.
Here are two more examples of judge-made constitutional doctrines that seem to rest, in part anyway, on bad economic thinking.
First, the presumption that due process of law in repossessing property obtained on credit requires a hearing before rather than after
repossession is defended by asserting that property rights will be
impaired without such a hearing. Second, the principle that legislation which seems irrational must therefore violate the due process
or equal protection clauses is defended by reference to a model of
the legislative process in which the characteristic product of the process is legislation that promotes the general welfare. In truth, requiring "predeprivation" hearings in credit-sale cases willjust raise
interest rates, to the detriment of the class ostensibly protected by
additional procedural safeguards. And the interest group theory of
politics - revived, refined, and expanded by economists1 9 - suggests that it is quixotic to invalidate all legislation that is not welfare
maximizing. The point is not that no legislation promotes the general welfare, but that the legislative process is a market in which legislation is in effect auctioned off to the highest bidders, and often
these are compact interest groups scheming to transfer wealth to
themselves from diffuse, uninformed, and for both reasons underrepresented groups, such as consumers and taxpayers. An unknown
but possibly quite large fraction of legislation reduces the total
wealth of society without making the distribution of that wealth any
more "equitable" according to any defensible criterion of distributivejustice. A consistent judicial commitment to good-faith "rationality review," designed to identify and invalidate "nakedly"
redistributive legislation, would therefore portend an enormous increase in the already overextended role of the courts in our society,
and might, indeed, require a return to the Lochner era (see Part V).
A more modest function of economic analysis in relation to
noneconomic doctrines is to remind the courts that all legal doctrines have costs. By displaying those costs, whether analytically or
quantitatively, the economist can place warranted pressure on the
supporters of the doctrines to establish the existence of offsetting
benefits. For example, the exclusionary rule leads to overdeterR.

18. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). For criticism, see
supra note 5, § 28.3, at 633-34.
19. See R. POSNER, supra note 5, §§ 24.4, 25.3.

POSNER,
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rence of police searches. The resulting costs to the legal process,
and to the community (in the form of a higher crime rate, because
criminal investigations are made more cumbersome and uncertain),
cannot easily be justified if there exists - and there does - an alternative sanction, the tort suit, which if properly configured would
provide a deterrent more likely to approximate the optimum. 20
IV. Implicitly Economic ConstitutionalDoctrines
A number of provisions of the Constitution seem to have an implicit economic logic. This is perhaps clearest with respect to the
"negative" or "dormant" commerce clause, which is to say the interpretation of the commerce clause as forbidding states to erect
barriers to interstate commerce unless Congress authorizes them.
When so interpreted, the commerce clause becomes a charter of
free trade - a subject of detailed economic analysis since Adam
Smith - and, relatedly, an element of an efficient federalism. By
preserving the sovereignty of the states the Framers of the Constitution created a danger that, like independent nations, states might be
pressured by interest groups to establish trade barriers. This would
be of no concern if competition among states were perfect, for that
would imply that any consumer or supplier in a state who was
harmed by such a barrier would move immediately and costlessly to
another state; the trade barrier would be ineffective. But as mentioned earlier, interstate competition is not perfect; there are significant immobilities. If Wisconsin, say, forbids the importation of milk
in order to protect its dairy farmers, the price of milk in Wisconsin
will rise, and although Wisconsin consumers will be hurt, they may
lack sufficient political "clout" (being a diffuse and unorganized
group) to undo the prohibition, while the costs of relocating to another state may be too great for them to vote against the prohibition
with their feet. The "negative" commerce clause is one device (and
the privileges and immunities clause in Article IV is another - and
one better grounded in the text and history of the Constitution 2 )
for preventing states from abusing their "market power" and thus
for ensuring that the federal principle is used to promote rather
than retard interstate competition aimed at optimizing the cost and
quality of governmental services.
The takings clause of the Fifth Amendment also seems founded
on economic considerations - and so indeed does the Fourth
Amendment (and not just the exclusionary rule that has been
20. See supra note 17.
21. See Eule, Laying the Dormant Comnmerce Clause to Rest, 91 YALE LJ. 425, 446-55
(1982). For further discussion of the economics of the negative commerce clause, see R.
POSNER, supra note 5, §§ 26.3, 26A, and references cited therein at 612-13.

1987]

HeinOnline -- 56 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 17 1987-1988

grafted onto it by the courts). In forbidding only unreasonable
searches and seizures, the Fourth Amendment requires courts to
balance the costs, to privacy and property, of searches and seizures
against the benefits in reducing the incidence of crime, and therefore to use an essentially economic calculus in applying the amendment to specific conduct. In so arguing, I do not mean to suggest
that any time a legal doctrine requires judgments of more and less,
as almost any doctrine that speaks in terms of reasonableness does,
it is economic in character. All rational activity involves a balancing
of pros and cons, and while economics is in its broadest sense the
science of rational choice, it does not follow that every rational
choice is in an interesting sense economic. Moreover, the things
balanced might not be monetizable even in principle, or might be
weighted in a manner remote from utilitarian or economic calculation. It is an empty form of economic analysis of law that is content
to attach the economic label to every balancing test in law. However, as I have argued elsewhere in discussing the Fourth Amendment,2 2 economics does more than identify the interests to be

balanced. It teaches that the exclusionary rule leads to overdeterrence by creating a sanction that costs more to society than the social (not private) cost of an illegal search to the criminal defendant,
and it teaches that, other things being equal, the graver the crime
being investigated the lower should be the level of probable cause
that the police need establish in order to be authorized to conduct a
search. These are not truisms; they are nonobvious implications of
economic analysis.
I even believe that the speech and religion clauses of the First
Amendment can be interpreted to require that the government allow the operation of a free market in ideas and religion respectively,
so that no regulation of these markets that cannot pass a strict efficiency test should be allowed to stand. Such an interpretation
seems broadly consistent not only with the delphic text and equivocal background of these provisions, but with much, though not all,
of the vast interpretive superstructures that have been erected on
them.23 Again, I am not suggesting that (for example) just because
the courts balance the interest in a fair trial against the interest in
freedom of the press in deciding what restrictions can be placed on
news coverage of a trial, what they are doing is economics in an
interesting sense. But I do think that economics is useful in explaining the situations in which censorship is allowed and not allowed,
the differential treatment of commercial and noncommercial
speech, and such interpretive concepts under the First Amendment's religion clauses as "neutrality" and "accommodation." But
these are stories for another day.
I realize that in speaking of constitutional rights in economic
terms I open myself up to the accusation that I am distorting the
22. See supra note 17.
23. See Posner, Free Speech in an Economic Perspective, 20 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 1 (1986);
Posner, The Law and Economics Movement, 77 AM. EcoN. REV. PROC. 1, 7-12 (1987).
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meaning of the word "right" by viewing it as instrumental rather
than ultimate, a means rather than an end, a ground for resisting
governmental action rather than an absolute barrier to it. But the
truth is that the boundary of every constitutional right is drawn at
the point of balance between conflicting social goals; no right is absolute. The reason that the Constitution's prohibitions of such
practices as torture and slavery seem absolute is that the inevitable
balancing act is built into the definition of the practice. "Torture"
and "slavery" are not neutral, referential terms; they are the names
of the forms of practices (coercing statements and involuntary servitude, respectively) that we abhor. We do not call the methods by
which we permit confessions to be extracted against the betterjudgment of the suspect torture even though it is plain that there would
be fewer confessions if all custodial interrogation were forbidden.
And we do not call the forms of involuntary servitude that we condone slavery - whether that servitude takes the form of involuntary
military service, compulsory labor by prison inmates and prisoners
of war, school attendance under compulsory schooling laws, parents
making their children perform household chores, dangerous or
demeaning work that workers "agree" to do only under the compulsion of economic necessity, or adherence procured only by threat of
monetary or injunctive sanctions to a long-term employment contract that has turned disadvantageous to the employee.
I claim, indeed, that both the prohibition against extracting evidence by torture (one meaning that has been given to the Fifth
Amendment's self-incrimination clause) and the prohibition against
slavery (the Thirteenth Amendment) can be given an economic
grounding. A long history of using torture to extract evidence has
shown that it is an inefficient method of criminal investigation and
proof. It has very high error costs, creates much gratuitous suffering, and deflects law enforcers from devoting adequate resources to
solving difficult crimes; it is sometimes easier to extract a confession
from an innocent person by torture than to convict a guilty person.
As for slavery, it is abundantly clear that involuntary slavery is the
antithesis of the free market model that underlies most concepts of
economic efficiency. And while in principle it might occasionally be
efficient for a person to sell himself into slavery, at least temporarily
(as in eighteenth-century contracts of indentured servitude), so unlikely is such a case today that it makes good sense to ban self-enslavement; the probability is overwhelming that a case ostensibly of
self-ensIavement would in fact be a case of enslavement by force or
fraud.
Much could be said on each of the implicitly economic doctrines
of constitutional law, but they have been considered in some detail
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elsewhere 2 4 and I shall therefore pass on to

-

V Proposals to ConstitutionalizeLaissez-Faire
I refer to the proposals by legal scholars such as Bernard Siegan
and Richard Epstein to interpret the Constitution as a general guarantor of free markets, 25 and by some economists to strengthen this
aspect of our constitutional system by amending the Constitution:
for example to require a balanced federal budget in the hope that
this would reduce the role of government, and thus increase that of
private markets, in the allocation of resources.26 Obviously the
merit of proposals to reinterpret the Constitution cannot be appraised on economic grounds alone, even if the purpose and substance of the reinterpretation are economic to the core; for, as I
shall argue, the first task of interpretation is interpretation, rather
than the choice of optimal policies. Yet much of the argument in
support of such proposals is of course economic. And economics
does not just suggest the desirability of using free markets to allocate resources; it also points out the illogical features in existing interpretations of the "economic" clauses of the Constitution. As
Professor Epstein has stressed, to limit the takings clause to the
physical seizure of private property and ignore completely the effects of regulation in diminishing or even destroying property values is problematic, because the consequences of the two types of
seizure are often the same. True, there are also differences. Many
more people are affected by a regulation than by a taking, and therefore the organizing of political resistance is more feasible.2 7 And
the costs of rendering compensation are greater the more people
24. See R.

POSNER,

supra note 5, pt. 7, and references cited therein.

25. See, e.g., R. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT

DOMAIN (1985); B. SIEGAN, ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE CONsTrrUTION (1980); Epstein,
Toward a Revitalization of the Contract Clause, 51 U. Cm. L.REV. 703 (1984); ECONOMIC
LIBERTIES AND THEJUDICIARY (J. Dorn & H. Manne eds. 1987). I believe I was the first
to suggest that the discredited "liberty of contract" doctrine could be given a solid economic foundation and as good ajurisprudential basis as the Supreme Court's aggressive
modem decisions protecting civil liberties. See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw
§ 19.1 (1973). I have never believed, however, that such a restoration of the "Lochner
era" (so named because of Oliver Wendell Holmes's magnificent dissent in Lochner v.
New York, 198 U.S. 45, 74 (1905)) would be, on balance, sound constitutional law. Of
course, the idea of using the Constitution as a bulwark against redistributive (collectivist,
socialist) policies did not originate with me - it is the idea that underlay the cases of the
Lochner era. Its leading modem proponent is Friedrich Hayek. See, e.g., F. HAYEK, LAw,
LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY (1973); cf.Backhaus, ConstitutionalGuaranteesand the Distribution
of Power and Wealth, 33 PUB. CHOICE 45 (1978); Radnitzky, The ConstitutionalProtection of
Liberty, in HAYEK ON THE FABRIC OF HUMAN SoCIETY 17 (E. Butler & M. Pirie eds. 1987).
For general debate and discussion, see essays and comments in CONSTrrrIONAL ECO-

NOMICS, supra note 3; Proceedingsof the Conference on Takings of Property and the Constitution,
41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 49 (1986).

26. Probably a forlorn hope: The government can tax and redistribute wealth effectively through regulation, at small budgetary cost. See Posner, Taxation by Regulation, 2
BELLJ. ECON. & MGMT. SC. 22 (1971).
27. This point is only superficially inconsistent with the proposition stated earlier
that compact interest groups are more effective than diffuse ones. An interest group
with one member is compact all right (say, the owner of a home that the government
would like to take for an official residence), but is likely to be powerless. On the economics of interest group politics, see infra note 29.
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the "taking" affects, holding constant the total value affected. But
the differences must be brought into the analysis explicitly before
the traditional distinction between physical takings and regulatory
impairments can be validated on functional grounds.
Like any form of aggressive constitutionalism, whether left-wing
or right-wing, the economic libertarian approach (whether it takes
the form of reinterpretation of the existing Constitution, amendment, or both) diminishes the role of democracy - potentially dramatically. The approach does not entail merely a redirection of
constitutional protection from so-called personal liberties to economic liberties, for the consistent libertarian believes as strongly in
the former as in the latter. To him the "marketplace in ideas" is a
reality and not a metaphor, and sexual freedom, provided it does
not cause harm to third parties, is as worthy of constitutional protection as freedom to choose an occupation or decide how much rent
to charge a tenant. What is envisaged therefore is a drastic curtailment, across the board, in the scope of permissible legislative, executive, and administrative action. Not only much "moral"
regulation, but all redistributive measures, would be forbidden unless justifiable on efficiency grounds, as the basic criminal laws can
bejustified as measures against a crude but highly inefficient form of
"rent seeking," or as the charitable deduction from income tax can
be justified as a measure for overcoming the free-rider problem that
depresses charitable giving below the optimal level.2 8 The scope of
democratic government would not quite be limited to the selection
and oversight of persons administering a small number of relatively
uncontroversial governmental functions, such as internal and external security, the prevention of (other) harmful externalities, and the
encouragement of beneficial ones. But that is the direction in which
the proposal tends. And as both the regulation of morals and the
redistribution of wealth are commonplace activities of modern government (whether they should be is a separate question), there is
tension between the economic approach on the one hand and democratic political theory - not to mention democratic political practice -

on the other.

The tension illustrates how economic analysis challenges conventional pieties. If E.M. Forster was unable to give more than two
cheers for democracy, the economic analyst is unlikely to be able to
give more than one. The economist recognizes that government
can do some things better than the free market can do but he has no
reason to believe that democratic processes will keep government
from exceeding the limits of optimal intervention. On the contrary,
the acute free-rider problem of democratic voting (the benefits of
28. See R. POSNER, supra note 5, §§ 7.1, 17.8 at 469.
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voting are too small to make it worthwhile to incur the considerable
costs of becoming a well-informed voter) ensures that compact interest groups will be able to use the democratic process to redistribute wealth in their favor, often at great social cost.2 9

So, for

Proudhon's "property is theft," the economist is likely to substitute
"government is theft." This insight provides the essential underpinning for proposals to constitutionalize laissez-faire.
To grasp the nature and extent of the tension between laissezfaire and democratic political or legal theory it is necessary to distinguish between two fundamental political conceptions that are sometimes confused: limited government and democratic government.
The proponents of limited government want the government to be
relatively powerless and, partly for this reason, are not much interested in how the people who run the government are chosen; their
interest is in preserving a large sphere for private action free of governmental interference. The proponents of democratic government
want to make sure that the government is in some sense in the
hands of the people and are confident that if it is placed there it can
be trusted to promote the general welfare, without having to be limited. Among economists, Bentham was the most emphatic advocate
of the position that a democratic government, unimpeded by constitutional limitations, would indeed promote the general welfare. But
of course modern economic libertarians do not believe this. They
believe that unfettered democratic government leads to the special
interest state. They are of the limited-government school, and it
might almost be a detail whether the government being limited is
democratic or monarchical.
In fact, economists have little to say about forms of government.
Because our government is democratic, the economic criticisms of
government have focused on democratic government. Economists
have pointed out that because an individual's vote in a political election has little instrumental value (one vote is not going to change
the outcome), voters have only weak incentives to become informed
about the impact of public policy on them unless they can be
molded into effective interest groups. The result is a strong bias in
favor of legislation that favors such groups, regardless of the general will. This bias is an embarrassment to democratic theory, because, other things being equal, the smaller a group is the easier it
will be for its members to organize an effective interest group, while
the larger and more diffuse the group is that the interest group
seeks to plunder, the harder it will be for the members of the victimized group to concert resistance. But as there is no reason to believe that monarchy or dictatorship or oligarchy or other
nondemocratic forms of government are less susceptible to interest
29. See G. STIGLER, THE CITIZEN AND THE STATE: ESSAYS ON REGULATION (1975);
Becker, PublicPolicies, PressureGroups, and Dead Weight Costs, 28J. PUB. ECON. 329 (1985);
Becker, A Themy of Competition Among Pressure Groupsfor PoliticalInfluence, 98 QJ. EcoN.
371 (1983); Mueller & Murrell, Interest Groups and the Size of Government, 48 PuB. CHoIcE
125 (1986); Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MCMT. Sci. 3
(1971).
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group pressures, the economic criticism may be a criticism of government rather than of democracy. And democracy does have important advantages over the other forms of government. It is the
most risk-averse form (and most people are risk averse), and it
solves better than any other the problem of arranging an orderly
succession of government officials.
The more aggressive one's constitutionalism the more the riskaverse character of democratic government is compromised, however, as the locus of power shifts to a small, unelected, life-tenured
committee - the Supreme Court. It is not possible to limit government tout court; it is only possible to tell one branch to limit the
others. The branch with this fortunate assignment is part of limiting, not limited, government. A pragmatist must agree with Charles
Evans Hughes that the Constitution is what the judges say it is; the
practical effect of constitutionalizing laissez-faire would be to make
the Justices even more powerful oligarchs than they are today.
This point can be made more concrete by noting that the line between efficient public policy (which the laissez-faire Constitution
would permit) and purely redistributive policy (which it would forbid) is not clear in practice or even in theory. In particular, a good
deal of compelled redistribution of wealth may be the cheapest
method of preserving social peace and so may be cost-justified;
plausible examples are pro-union legislation designed to head off
labor violence, generous welfare allotments designed to head off riots in the slums, and make-work public employment designed to reduce the incidence of crime by enlarging the opportunities of
potential criminals to obtain lawful income, thereby increasing the
opportunity costs of crime. Moreover, some, perhaps much, "immoral" behavior between consenting adults may, like pollution,
have third-party effects warranting regulation. Indeed, economists
cannot even agree on what shall count as a third-party effect. If I am
offended by your reading pornography, does this mean that you are
imposing a cost on me and I am therefore entitled on strictly libertarian grounds to advocate a law against the sale of pornography even
to consenting adults? Finally, voluntary democracies, such as condominium associations, use majority-voting principles that allow for
some redistribution of wealth among members of the association.
Far from fixing clear limits to the welfare state the libertarian approach may, paradoxical though this must seem, lay a theoretical
foundation for inferring a constitutional obligation to provide basic,
and perhaps other, government services.3 0 After all, the libertarian
S0. This point is suggested in an unpublished paper by Professor Frank Michelman
of Harvard Law School. F. Michelman, Remarks at the Annual Meeting of the American
Political Science Association on "The Constitution, Property Rights, and the Welfare
State" (Sept. 4, 1987) (available from Professor Michelman). On the general question of
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approach, at least in the form pressed by its most ardent proponent
among lawyers, Professor Epstein, is rooted in the political philosophy of Hobbes and Locke, and latterly of Robert Nozick, all of
whom believe that the legitimacy of the state depends on our being
able to say that people would give up the liberties they enjoy in the
state of nature in exchange for the state's guarantees of internal and
external security. The "nightwatchman state" is the consideration
for the surrender of these liberties. What if the state fails to carry
out its part of the social contract? What if, for example, it provides
ineffectual police protection, a common situation in the United
States today? Does not the social contract theory that underlies the
libertarian approach to constitutional interpretation imply that the
state has violated the Constitution (viewed in that approach as the
embodiment and guarantor of the social contract)? But why stop
with police protection? What about fire protection, public education, and even welfare - all services that the state provides in lieu of
private services? To the extent that public provision of these services cannot be justified in laissez-faire terms, Epstein might reply
that the Constitution forbids their provision, and hence the issue of
their adequate provision does not arise. But as I said earlier, the
boundaries of the nightwatchman state are uncertain, and a variety
of services not envisaged by Hobbes and Locke, ranging from pollution control to public support of the arts, may be reconcilable with
it. Does not the libertarian approach therefore open up vast possibilities for a most aggressive constitutionalism - one that does
not just tell the state to leave people alone but tells it to allocate
more resources to particular public uses? I fear so.
A final objection to libertarian proposals for reinterpreting the
Constitution to make it a charter of laissez-faire is the cost ofjudicial
decisionmaking. Courts have limited competence to make economic (as other) decisions; and once it is recognized that constitutional doctrines are not self-defining or self-enforcing, the risk of
heavy error costs and heavy litigation costs in any ambitious expansion of constitutional regulation becomes apparent. Courts seem to
do well in developing common law principles that allocate resources
efficiently; whether they would do well in shifting the boundary between common law and statutory regulation is more doubtful. The
courts may not be competent to oversee the return of the nation to
laissez-faire principles, however desirable those principles are.
VI.

Personal Versus Economic Liberties: The Double Standard

The recent upsurge of interest in remaking the Constitution into a
charter of economic liberties has brought to the fore the fascinating
issue of the contemporary dualism in constitutional interpretation.
..positive" as distinct from the more familiar "negative" constitutional liberties, see
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 812 F.2d 298 (7th Cir. 1987)
(and cases cited therein); Currie, Positive and Negative ConslittionalRights, 53 U. Cm. L.

REv. 864 (1986).
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However, discussion of that issue is not new; 3 1 indeed, the dualism
is not new. Between the 1890s and the late 1930s the Supreme
Court was extremely solicitous of infringements of economic liberty
but paid little attention to infringements of civil rights or civil liberties; since the 1950s the reverse has been true. No satisfactory explanation for this about-face has ever been offered - though if it is
interpreted, as it can be in part, as a change from emphasizing efficiency to emphasizing distributive values, it is consistent with
broader changes in the role of government over this interval. The
reversal is not total, and indeed recent years have seen an epicyclical
movement. The Supreme Court in the name of the First Amendment has partially deregulated commercial advertising, and in the
process has gone far to deregulate the legal profession.3 2 And in
cutting back on some of the excesses of the "Warren Court" in the
field of criminal and welfare rights the Court has sometimes employed a rough version of cost-benefit analysis.3 3 Nevertheless the
tendency to upgrade "personal" rights such as the right to an abortion, and to downgrade "economic" rights such as the right not to
have one's property taken without just compensation, the right to
occupational liberty, and the right to transact interstate business
34
without discrimination by reason of being a nonresident, persists.
Efforts to justify the contemporary dualism are no more convincing than efforts to explain it. Constitutional provisions protecting
personal liberties are no more emphatic or more broadly worded
than those protecting economic liberties. Article I, for example,
flatly forbids the states to pass any "ex post facto Law," or any "Law
impairing the Obligation of Contracts." The courts have rewritten
the first of these provisions to put "criminal" before "ex post facto,"
and the second to put "unreasonably" before "impairing." 35 Imag31. See R. POSNER, supra note 25, § 19.1; Coase,Advertisingand Free Speech, 6J. LEGAL
STUD. 1 (1977); Coase, The Marketfor Goods and the Marketfor Ideas, 64 AM. ECON. REV.
PRoc. 384 (1974); Director, The Parity of the Economic Market Place, 7 J.L. & EcoN. 1
(1964); Lucas, ConstitutionalLaw and Economic Liberty, IIJ.L. & ECON. 5 (1968); Mashaw,

ConstitutionalDeregulation: Notes Toward a Public,Public Law, 54 TUL. L. REv. 849 (1980);
McCloskey, Economic Due Processand the Supreme Court: An Exhumation and Rebuia 1962
SUP. CT. REv. 34.

32. See Coase, Advertising and FreeSpeech, supra note 31;Jackson &Jeffries, Commercial
Speech: Economic Due Process and the FirstAmendment, 65 VA. L. REv. 1 (1979); McChesney,
Commercial Speech in the Professions: The Supreme Court's UnansweredQuestions and Questionable

Answers, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 45 (1985).
33. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906-08 (1984); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). See generally Easterbrook, Foreword: The Court and the
Economic System, 98 HARv.L. REv. 4 (1984).
34. See, ag., CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 107 S.Ct. 1637 (1987); Fisher v.
City of Berkeley, 106 S. Ct. 1045 (1986); United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84 (1985);
Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984); Illinois Psychological Ass'n v. Falk,
818 F.2d 1337, 1341-42 (7th Cir. 1987) (discussing cases that distinguish "personal"
from "economic" rights).
35. On the interpretation of the ex post facto clause, see Calder v. Bull, I U.S. (3
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ine what a similar program of watering down clear constitutional
language would have done to the First Amendment! And it is not
true that the Framers thought that personal liberties were worthier
of constitutional protection than economic liberties or that the competition of interest groups would somehow produce a social optimum. 36 Nor is it true that courts know more about the personal and
social realm than about the economic realm, though they think they
do - confusing the technical with the difficult, as if evaluating the
consequences of a rent-control ordinance, which is a form of tax on
landlords and the subject of a vast and convergent economic literature, were more difficult than evaluating a tax on newspapers or the
ethical implications and social consequences of abortion on demand. It is not even true that racial and religious minorities, women, homosexuals, criminal defendants, advocates of unpopular
causes, or other groups whose members make aggressive claims of
civil rights and civil liberties necessarily have less political "clout,"
and therefore are more needful of judicial protection, than the victims of constitutionally dubious economic regulations. The victims
of oppressive economic regulations are mainly consumers, marginal
workers (predominantly female or nonwhite), poor tenants, and
other people of average or low income who - and this is the most
important point - are diffuse, inarticulate, unorganized, and therefore politically weak. That is why they are the victims of redistributive legislation.
Here, by the way, is a possibility for linking up the economic-libertarian approach to the Constitution with the more fashionable approach of John Ely, who argues that the grand design of the
Constitution is to assure representation, if need be by judicial action, for persons and groups who are underrepresented in the ordinary political process. 37 He thinks that blacks, homosexuals, aliens,
and adherents to unpopular religions or ideologies are typical examples of underrepresented groups; implicitly he believes that economic interests are well represented. But that is because he either is
not familiar with or does not agree with interest group theories of
the political process; maybe he also does not realize that corporations are not economic persons but merely conduits to persons
(workers, shareholders, employees) who may not be wealthy or well
organized. Only some economic interests are well represented those that are espoused by effective interest groups (e.g., by farmers, retail druggists, physicians, and lawyers). The interests of consumers, taxpayers, marginal workers, victims of crime, and
Dali.) 269 (1798); on the interpretation of the contract clause, see cases cited in Chicago
Bd. of Realtors v. City of Chicago, 819 F.2d 732, 742-44 (7th Cir. 1987). I am not
suggesting that these decisions are incorrect; Calder, for example, relied on the understood meaning of"ex post facto Law" in 1787. But in dealing with personal liberties the
courts typically do not rely on historical meanings, e.g., of religious establishment, freedom of the press, or cruel and unusual punishments.
36. See F. McDONALD, Novus ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE
CONSTITUTION ch. 4 (1985); Sunstein, Interest Groups in American PublicLaw, 38 STAN. L.

29 (1985).
37. SeeJ. ELY,
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housewives are seriously underrepresented. And on the other side,
the advocacy of personal liberties by "single-interest" groups is
often potent politically even though not supported by a majority; it
would be incorrect to think that blacks, or supporters or opponents
of abortion, or for that matter opponents of teaching the theory of
evolution, are not effective interest groups.
VII. The Macroeconomic Effects of the Constitution
I now want to shift gears and consider the overall economic effects of the Constitution. Stated concretely, would the United States
be less, more, or just as wealthy if, like England, we had no written
constitution? Before taking a stab at this question I must revisit the
ambiguity in the idea of a "constitution." Obviously, England has a
constitution, in the sense of a set of basic governing arrangements;
its parliamentary system is constitutional in this sense even though
Parliament could change it without worrying about judicial review.
One thing our Constitution did was to create a set of arrangements
-

the separation of powers system discussed earlier -

that was

(and is) different from that of England and most of the rest of the
world. Another important structural feature is, of course, the federal system, with all its refinements, such as the commerce clause.
In addition, the Constitution established a uniquely powerful judiciary to police adherence to these arrangements and enforce the various rights created by the Constitution and later by the Bill of Rights
and other amendments. The original Constitution, together with all
of its amendments and the interpretive glosses (often radical) that
the Supreme Court and the other courts have placed on the written
Constitution as it has been amended, is what I shall mean by "the
Constitution" in asking what its effects on economic progress have
been. A distinct and even more speculative question, which I shall
not essay, is what the effects of the Constitution on progress would
have been if the courts had adhered to its pristine terms or at least
interpreted it with greater restraint than they have shown.
The reasons why some nations are wealthier than others are not
well understood3 8 Obviously the difference depends in the long
run largely on national differences in the rate of economic growth,
but that just pushes the inquiry back a step, to the causes of those
differences. We know in a general way that economic growth depends on such things as the rate of saving, the rate of investment,
receptivity to technological change, changes in the composition of
the work force (e.g., because of immigration or emigration), and
changing attitudes toward work, but again this knowledge just
pushes the inquiry back a step, to why some nations invest more
38. See THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF GROWTH (D. Mueller ed.
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than others, and so forth. The role of legal institutions in all this is
obscure. It is highly plausible, however, that economic growth will
be helped if the government protects property and contract rights
through a system of impartial courts enforcing property, contract,
tort, and basic criminal law against not only private but also public
misconduct (e.g., expropriation). Such protections for economic
freedom would seem to encourage hard work and investment for
the future - yet even this is not certain, given Mancur Olson's
"destabilization" hypothesis, which is that stable institutions foster
interest groups and that war and other sudden shocks may set the
stage for rapid economic growth by making it more difficult for interest groups to form.3 9
I shall put Olson's hypothesis aside and assume that effective protection of basic economic rights promotes economic growth.
Although the basic protection of such rights is traditionally a function of state rather than federal law, the Constitution is not irrelevant to this function. As I mentioned earlier, the Constitution
guarantees a limited sovereignty to the states and thereby increases
the likelihood that governmental services, notably including the
provision of a court system, police, etc., for the protection of basic
property (including tort) and contract rights, will be provided efficiently. Given the federal concept - itself a force for efficiency, I
have argued - the Constitution has then to make provision for
preventing the federal system from degenerating into a loose confederation, riddled with externalities. The commerce clause and the
privileges and immunities clause are devices to this end, as is the
clause enabling Congress to issue patents and copyrights and the
clause giving the federal government a monopoly of bankruptcy law
in order to prevent debtors from fleeing to states where they might
dominate the government and obtain forgiveness of their debts.
The Constitution has other economic effects. By placing the basic
governmental arrangements beyond the power of the normal political process, the Constitution (in its structural aspect) has freed the
people's energies for productive private activities. 40 Basic political
questions have simply been removed from the agenda by making the
fundamental arrangements too difficult to change. This illustrates a
point too often ignored in discussions of rules: Rules can liberate as
well as repress. The rules of contract law are another example of
this point.
In addition, a government strong enough to maintain law and order, but too weak to launch and implement ambitious schemes of
economic regulation or to engage in extensive redistribution, is
probably the optimal government for economic growth. The Constitution as originally drafted would have kept the United States
39. See M. OLSON, THE RISE AND FALL OF NATIONS: ECONOMIC GROWTH, STAGFLATION, AND SOCIAL RIGIDITIES (1982); Olson, The Political Economy of Comparative Growth
Rates, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF GROWTH, supra note 38, at 7.
40. See S. HOLMES, PRECOMMITMENT AND SELF-RULE, CONSTHTIJTONALISM AND DEMoCRAcY

(J. Elster & A. Slagstad eds., forthcoming 1988).
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Government on approximately this even keel, for reasons explained
earlier; but judicial interpretations have, by authorizing a "Fourth
Branch" of administrative agencies, by expansively construing congressional power over interstate and foreign commerce and congressional power to enact statutes that purportedly promote the
general welfare, greatly strengthened the power of the federal government to regulate markets. As discussed earlier, the net impact of
the separation of powers on the power of government is uncertain,
because while in one respect it reduces that power by increasing the
transaction costs within government, in another it increases that
power by enabling government to exploit economies of
specialization.
Some of the specific rights guaranteed by the Constitution may
have had good effects from an economic standpoint. Plausible examples are the religion clauses of the First Amendment, which may
have reduced the amount of religious strife in this country - strife
antithetical to economic growth because it is destructive, time consuming, and rooted in nonmarket values; the speech and press
clauses of the First Amendment, which promote scientific and technical progress by protecting the marketplace in ideas; the takings
clause, which protects property rights (though incompletely); and
the due process clauses, which forbid the federal government and
the states to deprive persons of property without due process of law.
The problem is that a glance around the civilized world suggests
that a written constitution may not be necessary to secure these
rights. Countries at the same level of development as the United
States generally are free from serious religious strife, do not restrict
the production or dissemination of scientific or technical ideas, and
do not confiscate private property without compensation. The compensation is not always adequate - but neither is compensation
under the 'just compensation" clause of the Fifth Amendment as
the clause has been interpreted.
Although the separation of powers envisaged two hundred years
ago has been greatly relaxed, the structure of the federal government is still distinguishable, at least in table-of-organization terms,
from that of the dominant form of government in other countries at
our stage of development - the parliamentary system. In such a
system the legislature is supreme. Judges may, and in most advanced nations do, enjoy independence similar to that of our federal
judges, but they are not authorized to invalidate legislative acts.
The executive is a member of, and serves at the pleasure of, the
legislature. There are many variants of the standard arrangement.
In England, by virtue of its highly disciplined parties, the Cabinet is
supreme. France has a unique system of power sharing between the
president and prime minister, and Germany has a constitutional
19871
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court. But virtually no advanced country has a system that looks
much like our system, even countries whose contemporary governmental structures were influenced by the United States as an occupying power after World War II. The Philippines, along with some
South American nations - as well as, of course, all of our own
states, with the partial exception of Nebraska, which has a unicam-

eral legislature - has imitated the structure created by the Constitution, but minus its most distinctive and perhaps valuable feature federalism; and whether with good results can only be conjectured.
It would be perilous to infer from the failure of the leading foreign countries to imitate our system of governmerft that it must not
be a good system. But there is no solid evidence that it is superior
to a parliamentary system. Whether one tries to imagine what this
country would have been like under such a system or to compare it
with other countries, holding constant other determinants of wealth
and freedom besides constitutional structure, it is hard to be confident that ours is a better - or even, having regard for output rather
than input, for accomplishments rather than aspirations, a different
system. We are marginally less collectivist than most advanced
countries but the margin is small and there are counterexamples,
including Japan, which has a parliamentary system. Such a system
might, to be sure, be expected to exhibit faster and wider swings of
public policy than would a separated system, and with destabilizing
effects. Casual comparison with England supports this conjecture,
but most parliamentary systems do not seem to experience such swings and some experience fewer and narrower ones than we. Moreover, studies of England's surprising decline do not ascribe it to the
parliamentary system. 4 1 And to the extent that a parliamentary system enables government to turn on a dime, this has its upside (corresponding to our system's downside), illustrated by the swift
replacement of Chamberlain by Churchill in 1940 as compared with
our inability to replace promptly suchfainiantsas Buchanan, Andrew
Johnson, Wilson, Hoover, and Nixon. So far as size of government
is concerned, when due regard is had for regulation as well as expenditures (regulation in effect shifts part of the cost of government
from the taxpayer to the shareholders, employees, and consumers
of the regulated firm), our government seems to be as large as that
of most parliamentary systems and no more efficient.
I come back to my earlier suggestion that federalism may be the
most important contribution of American constitutionalism to economic growth. So vast, complex, and heterogeneous is this nation
that it is hard to imagine providing basic governmental services efficiently on a uniform, centralized, nationwide basis. Although the
federal government is of higher quality than most state governments, it would not be of higher quality if it absorbed every function
now performed by state government; this seems to be the lesson of
social security. I expect that it would be of lower quality than what
41.

See Brittan, How British Is the British Sickness?, 21 J.L. & EcoN. 245 (1978).
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the average of all the governments in this country now is, because
the spur of competition would be missing.
Not only is the upside of our Constitution somewhat uncertain
(despite the last point) from an economic standpoint, but there is a
downside. By making American law more complicated than it would
otherwise be, and by enhancing the prestige of lawyers, the Constitution may have contributed to an exaggerated concern with legality
and legal rights in this country, a concern that is a drag on economic
growth. In addition, the Constitution as interpreted has helped give
us one of the world's most costly and least effective criminal justice
systems. It has also (in the name of equal protection of the laws,
freedom of speech, and religious freedom) interfered profoundly
with the employment policies of American government at all levels,
and this too may have been a source of social costs with little offsetting social benefit - though one cannot be confident of this, because principles of efficiency do not dominate public employment.
VIII.

Economics and Interpretation

The last question I shall consider, the role of economics in constitutional decisionmaking, is a question about the proper limits of adjudication. Merely because economics may have many insights to
contribute to understanding constitutional questions (as I hope I
have shown), it does not follow that ajudge, at any level in the judicial hierarchy, is entitled to use these insights to resolve all such
questions. Although this point is simple and should be obvious, it is
sometimes misunderstood by critics of economic analysis of law and
perhaps by some defenders, and there may be some utility therefore
in repeating and amplifying it.
I am aware of the tension between this part of my paper and the
earlier parts. Earlier I took the hard-nosed approach to judicial interpretation of the Constitution, emphasizing the absence of incentives forjudges to act as honest agents, whether of the Framers or of
the present generation. And in the absence of incentives what is the
point of exhorting judges to conform to some preordained concept
of the judicial role? For two hundred years now, the federal courts
in general and the Supreme Court in particular have been "activist."
Often they have pushed their own power just as far as the political
system would permit (and that is far) and sometimes even farther.
What ground is there for expecting any change?
One possible answer is that, with the usual spurs to self-interest
ruled out by the terms and conditions -of judicial employment,
judges can be expected to be more than ordinarily concerned with
reputation. If, therefore, the climate of professional opinion
changes (as a result, perhaps, of articles such as this, though of
1987]
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course the impact of a single article is apt to be minuscule) and judicial activism is seen to be a vice rather than a virtue, we can (without
straying from the economic model of human behavior) expect that
more judges will forswear or at least reduce activism.
There are two fundamental normative approaches to constitutional adjudication. The first regards the Constitution as essentially
an empty vessel into which the judge pours his own ideas of sound
policy. No judge avows such an approach, but there are a fair
number ofjudicial decisions that cannot be otherwise explained and
there is a fair amount of implicit and explicit scholarly support for it.
The age of the Constitution, the generality of many of its provisions,
the rejection (indeed infeasibility) of strict construction of constitutional language, the absence of clear-cut "legislative history" for
many of the Constitution's provisions, the tradition, the popularity,
and the occasional pragmatic triumphs ofjudicial activism, the vast
accumulation of constitutional precedents (many inconsistent and
all subject, in principle, to reexamination by the Supreme Court),
the political character ofjudicial appointments, the rise of interpretive skepticism - this medley of forces and conditions has created a
situation in which a Supreme Court Justice can go in virtually any
direction that his personal political philosophy moves him without
appearing to violate his oath of office. A Justice who took up the
invitation thus extended and believed that normative economics
(say, the idea of wealth maximization that I have defended) provided
the best orientation for public policy would feel himself free - at
least insofar as he was able to persuade enough of his brethren to
constitute a majority and able to avoid being overruled by constitutional amendment - to decide constitutional cases in such a way as
to make constitutional law economically efficient. For such ajustice,
economics would provide a virtually complete guide to adjudication.
The other fundamental approach to constitutional adjudication
regards the judge as constrained, most of the time anyway, by the
text, structure, and history of the Constitution, and by certain general jurisprudential principles such as judicial self-restraint and decision according to precedent (stare decisis), in deciding
constitutional cases. Realistic practitioners of this approach recognize that the constraints are far from total; not every decision (to put
it mildly) is dictated. Moreover, important constraints, such as the
idea of judicial self-restraint, are themselves political principles,
42
chosen by judges rather than prescribed in the constitutional text.
And I have stressed that a legislative text cast in general terms establishing standards rather than rules - invariably delegates substantial discretionary authority to thejudges. So text, structure, history, etc., provide starting points but often not ending points for
decision. And therefore notions of economic efficiency might legitimately be used to resolve some, perhaps many, constitutional ques42. See R. POSNER, supra note 16, ch. 7 ('Judicial Self-Restraint").
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tions; I have given examples. But the first task of constitutional
adjudication is interpretation of a written text.
Interpretation is a problem in epistemology rather than economics, though economics is not irrelevant. Economics helps identify
the consequences of alternative interpretations, and consequences
are an important element in interpretation. One reason that no one
will interpret me literally if I say, "I'll eat my hat," is that it would be
a painful and protracted experience actually to eat a hat. Also, many
honestly interpretive decisions are influenced by judges' implicit
economic views and might therefore change if the judges were economically literate and realized for example that usury laws do not
help debtors and rent control laws do not help tenants. Moreover,
the interest group theory of politics, a theory to which economics
has made important contributions, has much to say about the nature
of the legislative enactments that courts are called on to interpret.
Nevertheless, the act of interpretation is notjust a form of economic
policy analysis.
The justifications for viewing the task of constitutional adjudication as interpretive rather than (purely) creative or wealth-maximizing have more to do with the theory and practice of politics than
with economics. People who are not lawyers, and in fact most lawyers, believe that most courts, most of the time anyway, decide cases
in accordance with law, viewed as a body of principles external to
the policy preferences of the individual judges. The legitimacy,
prestige, and ultimately the 'authority of the Supreme Court appear
to derive in significant part from this belief. If Lincoln was correct
that you can't fool all of the people all of the time, this belief had
better be true if the Court is to have a bright future, free of debilitating political controversy and popular suspicion. And if this is correct then it would be a serious mistake for the Supreme Court or any
other court implicitly or explicitly to embrace the view that constitutional law is merely the expression in legal decisions ofjudges' views
of public policy. It makes no difference whether those views come
from Friedrich Hayek or Friedrich Engels.
An economic point reinforces this conclusion. A body of constitutional law tied, albeit by a loose tether, to an unchanging text is
likely to be more stable than a body of law that the judges make up
as they go along, unless, as in the case of the common law, the values understood to shape their lawmaking are themselves stable.
The stability of the constitutional framework has economic value; by
reducing uncertainty it facilitates investment. Stability is not the
only value served by law, which is why a rigid policy of stare decisis
is not optimal; but it is a value and it therefore weighs on the side of
a policy of constrained constitutional lawmaking.
Not only is the proper starting point in formulating the principles
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of constitutional law the text, structure, and history of the documents that make up the Constitution, and the interpretive principles
(broadly conceived) that translate text, structure, and history into
contemporary meaning, but sometimes the starting point is the ending point. The Constitution provides that no one is eligible to be
President who has not reached the age of thirty-five. This provision
is perfectly clear (not because the words are clear, but because the
purpose is clear), so whether such a limitation on eligibility is economically efficient (it is not, as I said earlier) is irrelevant to the task
of adjudication. Many other provisions of the Constitution, though
of course not all of them, are also clear, at least tolerably so, and at
least with regard to some of the questions about their meaning. It is
reasonably clear for example that capital punishment today does not
violate the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments. Not only is capital punishment presupposed by
43
the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
(the latter promulgated long after the Eighth Amendment); not only
was it a common form of punishment throughout the period from
the adoption of the Bill of Rights to the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment; not only are there respectable retributive as well as
utilitarian arguments for it; but it has been supported continuously
by the vast majority of the people of the United States from the
founding of the nation up to the present day, so that it cannot be
dismissed as the product of a temporarily inflamed majority. 44 The
only candid basis on which it could be held unconstitutional would
be that it revolted a majority of Supreme CourtJustices. The refusal
of two Justices to accept its constitutionality in the face of overwhelming case law merely underscores the fact that the constitutionality of capital punishment is also supported by the principle of stare
decisis. These Justices' steadfast opposition may do them credit as
sensitive men of advanced ethical views, but it is difficult to ground
in law.
There are, however, many issues of constitutional law to which
the documents do not speak with clarity; and with every passing year
the documents recede further into the past and speak to us with a
fainter voice. Remember that the Framers faced the uncomfortable
choice between drafting rules, which would obsolesce rapidly, and
standards, which would endure but only because standards, by their
very nature, delegate much of the actual policymaking function to
the judges who apply the standards in circumstances that the Fram43. But this is the weakest argument for the constitutionality of capital punishment;
by assuming that capital punishment would continue to be administered and therefore
deciding to require procedural safeguards for its administration, the Framers were not
necessarily deciding that it could never be deemed a cruel and unusual punishment.
44. I do not rely merely on the well-known public opinion polls on the death penalty. Polls are unreliable indices of public opinion for a variety of reasons, including the
fact that the person polled is not being asked to pay the costs of whatever public policy is
being asked about. Yet when the poll data are added to the evidence provided by the
unbroken history of statutes in most states imposing the death penalty, there can be
little doubt that the death penalty is and always has been "popular" with the vast majority of Americans.
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ers did not foresee. This point must not be pressed too far. I do
think it is important to insist that the Constitution is a communication from the adopters to the judges and that the judges' duty is to
decode the communication as best they can. 45 But often this is difficult or even impossible, and then the judges must have recourse to
"interpretive" principles that may actually be substitutes for interpretation in a narrow sense. The Framers both expected the Constitution to endure (this is apparent from the obstacles that they
created to amending it) and must have known, being highly intelligent men and, many of them, experienced lawyers, that many of its
most important provisions were unspecific and would become even
less directive as time passed and social change threw up new and
unforeseen problems within the general scope of the provisions.
They left many important details to be filled in through the adjudicative process over which the Supreme Court was to preside.
Consider, by way of example, the clause in the First Amendment
that forbids Congress to make any law respecting an establishment
of religion. "[E]stablishment" is not defined. At the time the First
Amendment was drafted and ratified there were established
churches in some of the states and of course in England (as there is
today). Although the principal purpose of the clause apparently was
to confirm the federal government's lack of authority in matters religious, 46 unquestionably the clause by its terms forbids Congress to
establish one of the Christian sects as the national church, as Massachusetts, for example, had established the Congregational Church
as its state church. Can the clause be interpreted as going further
and forbidding Congress to declare Christianity the official religion
of the United States? The nation was overwhelmingly Christian in
1789; there were few Jews or acknowledged atheists, and virtually
no Moslems; and there is some doubt whether the religion clauses
were intended to protect any "infidel."' 47 Today the country is vastly
more diverse religiously, and an attempt to establish Christianity as
the national religion would be enormously resented even in the unlikely event that it could command the assent of a majority of both
houses of Congress and avoid or override a presidential veto. Does
the concept of "establishment" have sufficient play in its joints that
it can be interpreted to forbid the establishment of Christianity, not
just the establishment of a particular sect? I think it does, when one
considers the general terms in which the establishment clause is
45. I develop this view in Posner, Legal Fonnalism,Legal Realism, and the Inteiprelation
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 179 (1987). Cf Powell, The Ofiginal Understandingof OriginalIntent, 98 HARv. L. REV. 885, 911 (1985).
46. See L. LEvY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
84, ch. 5 (1986).
47. See Wallace v. Jafree, 472 U.S. 38, 52 & n.36 (1985).

ofStatutes and the Constitution, 37
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written ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion") and its underlying objective of keeping government from
taking sides in religious controversies. But I reach this conclusion
by interpreting the clause in a manner designed to fit its underlying
purposes or principles to current conditions, irrespective of my notions of sound policy, or economically efficient policy, whereas I
think that, however abhorrent one may personally find capital punishment, there is no persuasive interpretive route by which to invalidate it under the Constitution.
The task of constitutional interpretation is not exhausted by study
of the text, context, and background of the Constitution, for it is
influenced by certain large jurisprudential principles, of which the
two most important are judicial self-restraint and stare decisis. As I
have explained elsewhere, 48 judicial self-restraint, if it is to have any
concrete meaning, cannot be equated to caution, prudence, moderation, or refusal to innovate. That would simply run it together with
stare decisis. It properly means a disposition to limit the power of
the courts (in the realm of federal constitutional law, the power of
the federal courts and above all the Supreme Court) vis-a-vis the
other organs of government - Congress, the President, the federal
administrative agencies, and all branches of state government. It
means pulling in the federal judicial horns. The federal courts are
overextended today and may eventually find it difficult to maintain
their effectiveness unless they learn to defer more to the other
branches of government. But the force of the principle of self-restraint is necessarily limited. It cannot properly be used to override
relatively clear constitutional directives; otherwise it would nullify
the Constitution. It is usable only in very close cases. In my establishment clause hypothetical the restrained solution would be to allow Congress to establish Christianity as the nation's official
religion; but I cannot believe it would be the correct solution; the
arguments for interpreting the clause to forbid such a measure are
powerful. The principle of judicial self-restraint is properly a tiebreaker.
The principle of stare decisis, so far as pertinent here, is thatJustices of the Supreme Court should stand by the existing interpretations of the Constitution unless a powerful reason for departing
from them is shown. Because it is so difficult to undo a constitutional decision by the amending process, a rigid adherence to precedent in this area would be unsound. This is provided one thinks
that a later decision, informed as it is by experience not available to
the authors of the earlier decision, is therefore more likely to be
right than its predecessors. Either decision - the original, or the
overruling - will, if wrong, be equally difficult to correct through
the amending process. But the overruling decision is somewhat
more likely to be correct than the overruled one, if only because the
former will be based on more experience than the latter.
48. See R. POSNER, supra note 16, ch. 7.
HeinOnline -- 56 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 36 1987-1988

[VOL. 56:4

Posner
THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

The opposite extreme, which involves treating every constitutional question as being up for grabs however often it has been decided in the past, is also untenable. There are three related reasons
for this conclusion. The first is that an area of law will never be
settled if opponents of existing doctrines believe that a mere change
in the membership of a court will wipe the slate dean and make
every legal question one of first impression; and there is value in
legal stability, as I said earlier.
Second, the idea of decision according to law, on which popular
belief in the legitimacy of constitutional adjudication rests, is weakened if decisions are conceived of as having no binding effect on
judges who did not actually vote for them. This suggests that a decision should not be overruled if (1) none of the judges who joined it
originally has changed his mind and (2) no relevant circumstances
have changed since the original decision, so that it is impossible to
say that the original decision may have been correct when decided
and has merely become obsolete. These grounds are roughly reciprocal. Usually, (2) will be available only if, through passage of time,
few if any participants in the original decision are still on the court.
And if (1) is available, chances are that not enough time has elapsed
since the original decision for (2) to be.
Third, a decent respect for the possibility that one's own constitutional notions may be wrong should make a judge hesitate to set
them up in opposition to the contrary views of many previous
judges who have wrestled with the same question and come to a
different answer.
There is an obvious tension between the idea of judicial self-restraint and the idea of decision according to precedent. If (the position we are in today) the body of judge-made constitutional law
contains a high proportion of aggressive doctrines created during a
long period in which judicial activism was in the ascendancy, to
make self-restraint effective would require overruling a lot of cases
and thereby damage the principle of stare decisis - -which is also an
important principle. There is no satisfactory general resolution of
this tension.
The task of interpretation in light of general jurisprudential principles such as self-restraint and stare decisis is logically prior to the
application of economic theory to constitutional adjudication. It
would be irresponsible to approach the task of constitutional adjudication by asking how constitutional law can be made to conform to
the dictates of economic efficiency, even -if,as I believe, efficiency
provides the best single guide to public policy in general and judicial doctrine (i.e., common law, state or federal) in particular. The
limits of an economic approach to deciding constitutional cases are
1987]
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set by the Constitution interpreted in light of the principles I have
discussed.
Yet within those limits much can be done with economics. Consider again whether capital punishment violates the Eighth Amendment. The case for such a conclusion would be strengthened if it
turned out that capital punishment had no incremental deterrent effect over life imprisonment, for this would suggest that it was being
imposed out of sheer bloodthirstiness. I do not think the case
would be conclusive even so, for one man's bloodthirstiness is another's (Kant's, for example) just retribution. In any event the economic model of crime and punishment suggests, and there is some
confirmation in empirical research by economists, 49 that capital
punishment does have an incremental deterrent effect. So although
the Eighth Amendment has no clear economic interpretation, economics may provide insight into questions that bear on the proper
legal interpretation.

49. See D. PYLE, THE ECONOMICS OF CRIME AND LAw ENFORCEMENT ch. 4 (1983) (citing studies).
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